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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brittany Lonj 'e Jones argued in her Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in
denying her motion to suppress because the officer who observed her driving in the left lane of
I-15 just south of Idaho Falls, at ten miles per hour below the posted speed limit, did not have
reasonable suspicion to believe she had committed a traffic violation, and his observations of
Ms. Jones both before and after the stop did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to justify a drug investigation. (Appellant's Br., pp.5-11.) In its Respondent's Brief, the
State responds to the first argument as if it presents an issue of fact rather than an issue of law.
(Respondent's Br., pp.7-13.) Ms. Jones submits this Reply Brief to properly reframe the
argument as a legal argument, premised on the district court's (incorrect) ruling that the officer
had reasonable suspicion to believe Ms. Jones violated Idaho Code § 49-630(2) by driving
slowly in the left lane.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Jones include a statement of facts and course of proceedings in her Appellant's Brief,
which she relies on and incorporates herein. (Appellant's Br., pp.1-3.) She includes this section
only to provide citations from the record in support of her argument that she may have been
stopped, in part, based on her race and her out-of-state license plates. (See Appellant's Br., p.10,
Respondent's Br., p.16, note 3.) Ms. Jones is black. (Con£ Exs., pp.I, 46.) Ms. Jones was driving
an SUV with California license plates at the time she was stopped. (Con£ Exs., pp.4, 44.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Jones's motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Jones's Motion To Suppress

A.

The District Court Erred In Concluding, As A Matter Of Law, That The Officer Had
Reasonable Suspicion To Believe Ms. Jones Violated Idaho Code § 49-630(2) Despite
What It Recognized As A "Conflict" Between The Statute And The Road Signage
Directing All Northbound Through Traffic To Travel In The Left Lane
The State asks this Court to uphold a factual finding that does not exist. The State asserts

Ms. Jones's argument fails "as a matter of fact" because the officer testified that when he
stopped Ms. Jones, she "had driven on a section of the interstate with three lanes" as opposed to
two lanes. (See Respondent's Br., p.7 (quotation marks omitted).) The State argues that, based on
its view of the facts, even if the far right lane was "unavailable" for Ms. Jones on account of the
road signage directing all northbound through traffic into the left lane, she could have driven in
the middle lane and thus not violated§ 49-630(2). (Respondent's Br., p.7.)
The State acknowledges, as it must, that "the district court did not make a specific factual
finding regarding the amount of lanes near Mile Marker 119." (Respondent's Br., p.12.) The
district court, then, did not reject Ms. Jones's argument as a factual matter, but as a legal matter.
The question presented to this Court on appeal is not whether the officer's testimony "plainly
shows" that the interstate had three lanes as opposed to two lines at the time the officer effected
the stop. 1 Instead, the question is whether the district court correctly concluded, as a matter of

1

With respect to the factual question, which was not the basis for the district court's ruling, it
appears the officer testified that, at the time he pulled Ms. Jones over, there was an on-ramp, a
northbound right lane, and a northbound left lane, though it is somewhat hard to tell. (See
Respondent's Br., pp.10-12.) In any case, even if the officer testified that there were three
northbound lanes at the time he effected the traffic stop, he had to have developed his suspicion
that Ms. Jones committed a traffic violation earlier. He testified he was monitoring traffic "closer
to Milepost 116" when he saw Ms. Jones' s vehicle and "it appeared to be that she was more
concerned about me being there than the normal flow of traffic." (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-18.) He testified
3

law, that the conflict that exists between the road signage and § 49-630(2) is irrelevant in the
reasonable suspicion analysis.
The district court found, as a factual matter, that "there is some conflict between the road
signs directing thru traffic to the left lane and the application of § 49-630(2) to the area in
question." (R., p.152.) The district court concluded, as a legal matter, that the conflict between
the signage and the statute was irrelevant because "the issue before the Court is not whether
Defendant actually violated § 49-630(2), but whether the officer had a reasonable basis to
believe Defendant was violating § 49-630(2)." (R., p.152 (emphasis added.) This is the legal
conclusion Ms. Jones challenges on appeal.
The State addresses Ms. Jones's legal argument only in a footnote. (See Respondent's
Br., p.13, note 2.) The State argues Ms. Jones could have complied with both the road signage
and § 49-630(2) by driving at the normal speed of traffic in the left lane. (Id.) The State asserts
"[Ms.] Jones has failed to show any conflict in the statutes because her argument is premised on
the belief that she had some right to drive in a way that impeded traffic. That she had no such
right for a few miles does not invalidate the traffic stop." (Id.) The State does not cite any
authority for its legal argument, which (again) it relegates to a footnote. (Id.) And the State does
not discuss, as a matter of statutory interpretation, how this Court should reconcile the conflict
between Idaho Code§ 49-630(2) (requiring any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed
of traffic to be driven in the right-hand lane available for traffic), and Idaho Code § 49-801(1)
(requiring the driver of any vehicle to observe the instructions of any traffic-control device), in
the area near Idaho Falls where Ms. Jones was driving.

he saw the vehicle "continue to slow" and "had she been doing the speed limit in the left lane, I
wouldn't have made the traffic stop." (Tr., p.22, Ls.19-20, p.26, Ls.16-19.)
4

The district court erred in concluding Ms. Jones violated § 49-630(2) by driving below
the speed limit in the left lane, where road signs indicated that was the only lane available for
northbound through traffic. Where an officer observes conduct that is determined, after the fact,
not to constitute a statutory violation, the officer lacks reasonable suspicion for the stop. See,

e.g., State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 447 (2015) (concluding officer's stop of the defendant was not
justified where the defendant's act of driving onto, but not across, the line marking the right edge
of the road, did not violate the relevant statute). This Court should reverse the district court's
order denying Ms. Jones's motion to suppress because the stop was not supported by reasonable
susp1c10n.

B.

The District Court Erred In Concluding Officer Cox Had Reasonable Suspicion To
Extend The Stop For A Drug Investigation
On this issue, Ms. Jones relies on the argument contained in her Appellant's Brief (See

Appellant's Br., pp.8-11.)

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in the Appellant's Brief, Ms. Jones
respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction, reverse the district court's order
denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2020.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of September, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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